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HUSSERL'S LOGICAL INVESTIGATIONS* 
I 
History has not been very kind to Husserl's Logical Investigations. 
Matters might have been different if Bertrand Russell had actually read, and 
understood, the copy he had with hirn in prison in Brixton during the first 
World War, but by and large the work has had practically no effect on exact 
philosophy in general or on analytic philosophy in particular. Husserl 
hirnself is largely to blame for this state of affairs, since shortly after 
completing the work he sailed off into somewhat muddier, metaphysical 
waters. His later writings te nd to be unclear and to suffer from an excess of 
grandiose terminology, so that it is only sporadically that they continue or 
deepen the magisterial analyses and arguments of the Investigations of 
1900/01. This state of affairs is reflected in the history of the editions and 
translations of the book. Findlay's readable but imperfect translation - in 
itself a considerable achievement - appeared seventy years after the work 
was first published, and the editors of Husserl's works in Louvain have 
reflected the prevailing philosophical atmosphere on the Continent in that, 
at least until recently, they have concentrated their energies on bringing out 
editions of Husserl's later writings. Now, however, some twenty volumes of 
collected works later, and over eighty years after the appearance of Husserl's 
one true masterpiece, a critical edition of the work is at last available in 
completed form. 
Ursula Panzer's edition of volume 11 of the work, which comes nine years 
after Elmar Holenstein's edition of the Prolegomena to Pure Logic, the 
overture with which the six Logical Investigations proper begin, contains the 
texts of both the first (A) edition of 1900/1901 and of the second (B) edition 
of 1913/1921. The two volumes of the Panzer edition contain also the 
annotations and supplements interleaved between the pages of Husserl's 
own copy of the Investigations, and in her introduction the editor usefully 
summarises the changes Husserl made in this additional material and also 
the differences between the first and second editions of the Investigations 
themselves. 
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Wh at results is not, it must be admitted, easy to use for the reader 
interested in Husserl's first and in some ways more pregnant rendering of his 
ideas on logic. For the main text of the addition is that of B, a somewhat 
peculiar choice, given the easy accessibility of perfectly acceptable editions 
of B, and given also the intrinsic preferability of a comparative edition in 
which the second thoughts of the author are conspicuous as such, as 
contrasted with the rather topsy-turvy construction that is offered to us 
here. But this is me re carping. More important is the possibility that the 
editor may have tampe red with Husserl's plastic and complicated style in the 
interests of uniformity. Husserl employs the device of capitalising the 
indefinite article in order to emphasise that he is talking about a single, 
complex entity. Thus on p. 326 (line 15) he refers to certain possibilities of 
combination of meanings which yield 'nur einen Bedeutungshaufen statt Einer 
Bedeutung' ('only a heap of meanings, never One Meaning'). The editor has 
seen fit to convert 'Einer Bedeutung' into 'einer Bedeutung' ('only a heap of 
meanings, never a meaning'), which makes mincemeat of Husserl's point. 
II 
Husserl's own changes to the first edition - evident also in the 
annotations and supplements - fall into two main groups. First, there are 
the changes reflecting Husserl's conviction that he had discovered a new 
super-science of 'transcendental phenomenology' in which his earlier analy-
ses would somehow have their place - but in such a way that they would 
come to be seen in a 'newand radically different light'. Second, more 
interesting and more substantial changes, in which Husserl alters the details 
of his analyses, descriptions and arguments, or assays terminological 
improvements of various sorts. 
A characteristic change belonging to the first group is Husserl's occa-
sional removal of the word 'appears' and its derivatives in favour of 
expressions such as 'is brought to self-givenness' and the like. The most 
striking and indeed most notorious such change concerns Husserl's notion 
of the 'ego'. In the first edition Husserl had set out an interesting and 
original no-ownership account of consciousness, one of the few such 
accounts that is not reduced to conceiving the experiences inhering in my 
body as a mere 'bundle'. For Husserl's Investigations provide the me1!ns 
which enable hirn to show how these experiences can hang together in an 
orderly way without any egological prop. In newly appended footnotes to §6 
and §8 ofthe fifth Investigation, however, Husserl now teils us that he has in 
the meantime 'learned how to find' his pure ego - but fortunately he teils us 
also that this discovery is irrelevant to the inquiries he is here carrying out. 
Another change, not of the same order of importance, though it seems to 
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have been of so me significance to Husserl hirnself and has long fascinated 
hi.; various phenomenologist-commentators, concerns the status and proper 
designation of the inquiries in the philosophy of mind to be found already in 
the first edition. The Husserl of 1900, like Brentano, and like other Brentano 
students, was happy to produce detailed and painstaking accounts of the 
structure and nature of judgments, assumptions, emotions and the like. 
These accounts had in common the assumption that psychology rests on a 
kernel of necessary truths capable of being known apriori. Husserl's and 
Brentano's name for this kernel of necessity is 'descriptive psychology', and 
a great many changes to the first edition of the Investigations are concerned 
with the problems raised by this discipline. But they show us a Husserl 
worried not by the question how the assumption of such necessary truths 
should be defended, e.g. against. the criticisms of the empiricist; the Husserl 
of 1913 is worried rather by the task of distinguishing between a descri ptive 
psychology that would concern itself with such necessary truths as they are 
instantiated in the psyche of an actually existing subject, and a new 
discipline of 'phenomenology' which would deal with the same necessary 
truths but this time in a 'pure and radical' fashion. Whereas Husserl had 
originally been happy to identify 'phenomenology' and 'descriptive psychol-
ogy', he now takes great pains, in Band elsewhere, to stress that they are 
different. 
Among the changes belonging to the second - interesting or substantive 
- group are those to be found in Husserl's discussions cf indexicality. 
Husserl had earlier regarded indexical or, as he says, 'occasional' uses of 
language as derivative or deviant phenomena and his account of meaning in 
the Logical Investigations was developed on this basis. In a hitherto 
unpublished manuscript, however, Husserl sketches the beginnings of a 
more adequate view. He argues that the meaningful indexical use of the first 
person singular pronoun differs from the meaningful use of a proper name, 
because: 
Who says: 'I' does not merely name himself, but he is conscious of this self-naming as 
such, and this consciousness belongs essentially to constituting the meaning 0/ the word 
'/'. (p. 813, emphasis added). 
This idea can be generalised to apply to all occasional or indexical 
expressions. As Husserl points out, each indexical use of an expression such 
as 'thai' or 'these' or 'here' must be bound up in a single whole with so me act 
of perception on the part of the speaker. And he goes on to contrast such 
uses with the non-indexical use of a pronoun such as 'this' in anaphoric 
contexts. We also learn that, within a few years of completing the 
Investigations, Husserl had arrived at the conclusion that occasional or 
indexical uses of language are not the exception, but rather the rule: 
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'occasional moments lie in all assertions of the "concrete" sciences, first in 
all meanings referring to spatio-temporal objects but also in all meanings 
referring to empirical species' (p. XXXVII). 
The second Investigation, in which Husserl argues for universals - his 
term is 'species' - under which both individual things and also e.g. 
individual properties and relations fall, is revised only slightly, and indeed 
the theory of species and instance he re developed - which has its roots in 
the tradition of Aristotle and Porphyry - is important also to his later 
developmenL 
Husserl's third Investigation is his superb account of essentialism, 
existential dependence and the theory of parts and wholes, topics which 
more than any others structure what Husserl has to say in the other 
Investigations and so provide us with the key to reading the work as a 
whole. This investigation was fairly extensively revised for the second 
edition, but not all changes are of equal value. Thus Husserl inserted e.g. the 
words 'pure' and 'essential' wherever he got the chance (often - significant-
ly - substituting them for the word 'Aristotelian', a change which paralleis 
the move from 'descriptive psychology' to 'phenomenology'). Ursula Panzer 
suspects that these alterations were designed to emphasise what is indeed a 
very important point, the distinction between necessary co-conception -
the fact that it is impossible to think of a without thinking of b - and 
necessary co-existence - the fact that it is impossible for a to exist without 
b. Yet Husserl had seen as early as 1897 that the notions of dependence and 
independence, of parts and of moments, relate to all objects whatsoever and 
that these notions can be given a more than merely psychological interpre-
tation. It therefore seems more likely that these verbal changes reflect rather 
Husserl's gradually encroaching concern with the task of settling the status 
of his theories, as contrasted with the more modest job of working out the 
descriptive details of these theories themselves, as they apply to the things, 
events and processes of the real, material world. 
One felicitous verbal change to the third Investigation is Husserl's 
introduction of the term 'formal ontology' to cover all formal disciplines 
concerned with objects in the way that formal logic is concerned with 
meanings. Husserl's clarification of the distinction between formallogic and 
formal ontology and his still valuable account of the relations between both 
these disciplines and pure and applied mathematics are indeed among the 
most important and original contributions of the Investigations as a whole. 
It is interesting that the terminology of the remaining Investigations has 
also, at a number of crucial points, been brought into hne in B with the 
official theory of the third - again calling attention to the importance of the 
topics of moment or 'abstract part' and of dependence to Husserl's larger 
projecL Thus for example a term like 'act-character' in A, becomes 'act-
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moment' in B. And the printer's (?) erroneous 'momentary intuition' 
[Momentananschauung] in A has been corrected to 'intuition 0/ amoment' 
[Momentanschauung] in B (p. 265, 1.23), the printer's error then unfortu-
nately being reintroduced by Findlay as an error of translation. Findlay has 
in fact obscured most of HusserI's terminological revisions here (and 
thereby also the central importance of Investigation III and indeed the 
internal structure of many of HusserI's more detailed arguments) by utilising 
a range of distinct equivalents for 'moment' ('feature', 'aspect', 'element', 
etc.) more or less at random. This state of affairs is made still worse in the 
Boyce-Gibson translation of Ideas I, where 'moment' in the ontological 
sense ['das Moment', as in 'moment of inertia'] is confused with 'moment' in 
the temporal sense ['der Moment'] and translated as 'phase'. This error has 
given rise, in North America, to a whole industry of phenomenologist-
commentaries on an entirely spurious HusserIian theory of 'the correlation 
of noetic-noematic phases'. 
The most important substantial change to the third Investigation is the 
addition of useful new material on the nature of analytic concepts (§12 of 
the second edition). This material however replaces an extended discussion 
in A of the way in which the theory of existential dependence is to be applied 
to temporal succession and causality. This discussion is important because it 
throws light on a deep-rooted opposition between the theories of necessary 
dependence developed, respectively, by Husserl and by his teacher Brenta-
no. Brentano's own theory, presented in lectures of 1887-91 now published 
as Deskriptive Psychologie, is in some respects no less powerful than that of 
Husser!. One crucial difference between the two, however, is that within the 
Brentanian framework one can accept necessary dependence relations only 
between simuItaneous existents: the relation of necessary dependence can 
never relate entities existing at different points in time. This not only implies 
that Brentano's theory is inadequate to certain dimensions of temporal 
structure in the domain of conscious acts (e.g. relations involving memory 
or regret), but further, it prevents Brentano from providing, within his 
ontology, a place for the enduring material things of the spatio-temporal 
worId. 
The tide of III § 12 in Ais indeed "Concretum and thing. Generalisation 
of the concepts of independence and dependence via extension to the 
domain of succession and causality". We shall quote from it at length, both 
because it will give the English reader a suggestion of HusserI 's 'Aristotelian' 
concerns in A, and of the style of his treatment, and also because it is absent 
from the Findlay translation. 
HusserI points out first of all that the concept of a concrete or independ-
ent object, an object which can in principle exist in isolation from all other 
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objects, does not coincide with the concept thing. For we find concreta in 
this sense also, e.g., in the realm of sensations. 
To the unity 0/ the thing there belongs more than the individualised concretum; there 
belongs also (ideally speaking) a possible infinite manifold of temporally succeeding 
concreta of one and the same form, passing continuously into each other in the sense 
of the concepts of change and perseverance, this manifold being held together (either 
for itself or together with other associated manifolds of a similar constitution) through 
the unity of causality. This means that there obtains a lawfulness in relation to these 
manifolds which makes the concreta co-existing at any given point in time unilaterally 
dependent on those concreta of an arbitrarily chosen earlier point in time which are 
assigned to it in the sense of change or perseverance. (p. 261) 
The unity of the thing therefore consists in the existence of a continuous 
series of temporally instantaneous concrete 'contents' or 'objects' - Husserl 
uses these terms interchangeably - tied together by a causal law. 
There follows abrief formalised treatment of the relation between 
successive 'values' of a thing at successive instants (a relation later called 
'genidentity' by Kurt Lewin), which is followed in turn by an account of the 
trans-temporal dependence that is manifested in the material world: 
As a result of causality the concreta of a given instant are, whether of themselves or in 
consort with other co-existing concreta, dependent on those of an earlier instant -
and thus in a certain sense non-self-sufficient. It must however be noted, that the 
concept of dependence used by us so far was defined only as dependence in co-
existence ... It is however easy to generalise the concepts 0/ independent and dependent 
contents so that one would be able to distinguish between cases 0/ co-existence and 
cases 0/ succession. We need only so extend the concept of whole (and the concepts 
bound up analytically therewith), that one is allowed to speak not only of wholes 
(unities, connections) of co-existence but also of those of succession. Our concepts are 
then immediately applicable to things, whereby it is necessary only to observe the 
peculiar content which the talk of existence and co-existence take on when one talks of 
things. (p. 262) 
Where, therefore, the Brentanian theory of dependence relations can be 
applied exclusively as a means of elucidating synchronic structures, Hus-
serl's theory can be applied also to diachronies of various sorts, and was 
indeed so applied by lakobson in his influential writings on the implication-
al universals oflanguage acquisition and aphasia. 
Two appendices (pp. 837-843 and 850-852) show Husserl grappling with 
problems in whole-part theory left open in the third Investigation: the 
nature of the relation between an instance of red on the one hand and its 
logical part co/Dur on the other, and the distinction between this relation and 
the ordinary relation of inherence (e.g. of redness in a table); the notion of 
relative independence and the relation of this notion to various phenomeno-
logical examples; the relation between form and matter in a structured 
whole (whether this be a structured whole of acts or of meanings, or e.g. a 
thing and its properties): 
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A whole is not the parts taken together [das Zusammen der Teile], nor is it the parts 
together with the form, but the parts all together in this form. (The form is a concept 
that unites the whole in question with a manifold of possible wholes). (p. 841; compare 
Tractatus 2.0124-2.0141) 
Husserl considerably revised the fourth Investigation, on The Distinction 
between Dependent and Independent Meanings and the Idea 0/ Pure Grammar, 
the revised version being one and a half times the length of the original. 
Consider, for example, his treatment of the use of a proper name in § 3. 
Husserl here argues that the meaning-intention with which such a name is 
normally used - a certain mental event - is simple. The meaning of the 
name is therefore also simple, is not e.g. the meaning of any cluster of 
definite descriptions. But each such simple meaning act is necessarily 
associated with a variety of presentations [Vorstellungen], a fabric of 
presuppositions, reflecting what it is that the user of the name knows about 
its bearer. Thus when we use a proper name, our consciousness of the object 
(our meaning-consciousness) is not such that it is given merely as an empty 
somewhat, 'but as somehow determinate and typically determinable -
whether as a physical thing, an animal, a human being etc. - even if not 
meant in such capacities'. (p. 307) And then, the interest of Husserl's theory 
is that he can exploit his apparatus of species and dependence relations as a 
means of providing an account of the way in wh ich these presentations hang 
together with the act of name-meaning in such a way as to contribute to the 
intentional directedness of this act without being apart of the meaning of 
the name itself. 
Husserl also puts forward a treatment of modification, i.e. of that family 
of syntactic operations which is illustrated in transitions such as that from 
(e.g.) 'breathtaking performance' to 'cancelled performance' or from 'red 
elephant' to 'non-existent elephant', or in the transition from verb-phrase to 
nominalisation or from use to mention. Husserl 's elaboration of this not ion 
in B owes something both to Marty and to Reinach (see also ch. 4 of 
Twardowski's On the Content and Object 0/ Presentations). Its importance 
turns not least on the fact that philosophy itself, for example when it refers 
to existence, or to meaning, or to species, employs a systematically modified 
form of language, a form of language which will lead to misunderstandings 
- for example to Platonism - if one tries to interpret it in the light of the 
presumptions of our ordinary speech. 
The fifth Investigation, too, was considerably revised, though most of 
Husserl's changes are of a terminological nature and are designed to connect 
up with Husserl's views in Ideas labout transcendental phenomenology. 
Husserl's extended 80 page argument in §§ 22-43 of this Investigation, 
dealing with the correct way to understand the connection between proposi-
tional force and propositional content, must be one of the first examples in 
206 
modern philosophy of the sort of extended, careful argument that has 
become the norm - or at least the ideal - in analytic philosophy. 
The sixth Investigation was entireiy re-written by Husserl and his re-
writings are to appear, at some stage in the future, in aseparate volume of 
Husserliana. Husserl did not himself bring these revisions to a publishable 
form, and therefore allowed the 2nd edition of this Investigation to appear 
in 1921 in aversion merely 'partially revised'. 
III 
In recent years, particularly as a result of work by FClllesdal, McIntyre 
and Woodruff Smith, the so-called noema theory of meaning set out by 
Husserl in Ideas I has received a considerable amount of attention. The 
attractiveness of this later theory is due in part to the fact that Husserlian 
noemata resemble Fregean Sinne, and can indeed be seen as a generalisation 
of the latter. What is less often recorded is that Husserl had already, in the 
first edition of the present work, put forward another, quite different theory 
of meaning, resting on his twin theories of species and dependence. 
According to this earlier theory each mental event which is an act of 
language use, either for itself or taken together with other associated acts 
upon wh ich it is dependent, instantiates a species a/ a certain sart. It is then 
this very species which Husserl identifies as the meaning of the linguistic 
expression in question. 
This (' Aristotelian ') theory of meaning, which is of course in need of 
considerable refinement, has a number of immediate advantages. In the first 
place it yields a simple account of the nature of linguistic com~unication 
(mental acts of communicating subjects may instantiate identical meaning-
species). It yields also an elegant account of the relation between language 
and thought and of the relation between logical necessity and the contingent 
flux of mental events of judging and inferring. Moreover, this earlier theory 
appeals in its ontology only to the relatively familiar relations of instantia-
tion (between instance and species) and intentionality (between act and 
object). On the rater theory, in contrast, in which noemata function both as 
senses and as (mysterious counterparts of) reference, we have to accept in 
addition to instantiation and the intentionality of act and object also two 
further sui generis relations between the act and its noema and between the 
noema and its referent. Now it is a striking fact that, although the volumes 
under review contain a number of references to the second theory, and 
various terminological alterations designed to ease the transition to the 
latter, one finds no arguments for this second theory, just as no arguments 
are to be found in Husserl's later writings for his change of mind. 
It is still unfortunately the case that the first, second, fourth and fifth 
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Investigations are without any sort of detailed exegesis or commentary, in 
spite of the fact that the problems they deal with are one and all the subject 
of greatcontemporary in te rest. The first Investigation contains a number of 
distinctions that have since become standard within the philosophy of 
language, though Husserl draws these distinctions in ways that involve 
greater attention to cognitive detail than has been usual among analytic 
philosophers. 
The second Investigation argues that the notions of species and generality 
cannot be made sense of independently of an understanding of the notion of 
necessary or universal law. The fourth deals with the notion of syntactic 
completeness and incompleteness ('unsaturatedness') and presents a theory 
of syntactic and semantic dependence which influenced Lesniewski in his 
development of the first 'categorial grammar'. (Thus consider the relation 
between a name, a verb and the sentence they belong to. Husserl's account 
allows hirn to distinguish the relation of unilateral dependence of v~rb on 
name from the relation ofbilateral necessary constituency between verb and 
sentence - every senten ce necessarily contains a verb and every verb is 
necessarily apart of a sentence.) The fifth Investigation contains not only 
one of the most subtle accounts of indexicality in the literature of philoso-
phy, but also detailed accounts of the distinction between propositional and 
non-propositional attitudes and of the connection between force and 
content (phrastics and neustics) for all mental acts and states. 
Panzer's edition will, it is hoped, prepare the way for a detailed 
commentary on the whole of the Investigations of the sort that already exists 
in plenty for Wittgenstein 's Tractatus. Now that there is a revisal ofinterest in 
a number of quarters in just that combination of themes that the Investiga-
tions develop so masterfully - cognitive and perceptual psychology, formal 
ontology and formal meaning-theory and the thorny problems posed by any 
attempt to give these a unified treatment - such a detailed commentary 
would be more than welcome. 
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